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Excerpts From a Symposium on Tort
Law Developments in 1987
Donald J. Farage*
I. Loss of Consortium
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines "consortium" as a
"symbiosis:" i.e., a living together to mutual advantage. The verb,
"to consort," has been defined as, "to join, marry, to associate or
keep company with." The noun, "consort," is defined as, "a partner,
neighbor; originally, a companion, a partner." Despite the breadth of
this definition, early common law only recognized the right of a
master to recover for loss of services when his servant was negli-
gently injured. By 1619, this right was extended to a husband with
reference to marital services lost as a result of injuries to his wife
inflicted by a negligent tortfeasor. Initially, the cases imposed liabil-
ity only for loss of services. Eventually, the courts began speaking of
recovery for, "loss of consortium," which included damages for loss
of sexual attention, society and affection, as well as for medical ex-
penditures made on the wife's behalf.'
Originally, there was no similar action in favor of the wife when
the husband was killed or injured. Since the husband's claim derived
from the expansion of the "services" owed to him by the wife, and
because he owed the wife no "services" at all, she could not recover
for loss of consortium when he was killed or injured. Even though
she lost support, the wife was denied all remedy.2
Despite almost universal criticism of this result by both writers
and judges, the discrimination against wives persisted, even after the
Married Women's Acts.3 Believe it or not, it was not until 1950 that
* Education: University of Pennsylvania (A.B., 1930: LL.B., first honors, 1933);
awarded LL.D. by Dickinson School of Law, 1966. Author: PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS TO
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1940); PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS TO RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS (1957); Co-editor, HAZARDS OF MEDICATION (1971, 2d ed. 1978); Assistant to
Prof. F.H. Bohlen, Reporter, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1933-36). Professor: Dickinson School
of Law, 1934-46 and 1950-present; George Washington University Law School, 1948-50; Vis-
iting Professor of Medical Jurisprudence, Jefferson Medical College of Thomas Jefferson Uni-
versity, 1948-76.
I. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 125 (5th ed. 1984).
2. Id.
3. SHEPARD'S ACTS AND CASES BY POPULAR NAMES 699 (1986).
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an American court allowed a wife to recover for loss of consortium.'
It was not until 1974 that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, usually
among the latecomers, permitted a wife to recover for loss of consor-
tium as a matter of right under the Equal Protection clause of the
Constitution. 5 Previously, in 1960,0 the majority, although acknowl-
edging that a number of other states had recognized such a cause of
action, continued to deny it. Justice Musmanno's dissent in Neuberg
v. Bobowicz, later became the prevailing rule. In his usual colorful
language, Musmanno challenged the majority to explain," . . . how
it [could] take two identical situations and make fish of one and fowl
of the other? How can it deny sauce to the gander when it ladles it
out overflowingly to the goose?" 7 In any event, the overwhelming
majority of courts now permit a wife to recover for loss of consor-
tium on an equal basis with the husband when she has been deprived
either by injury to, or death of, the husband.
Suppose that a man and a woman are living together, but are
not married. May the woman recover for loss of consortium if the
man is injured or killed? In Butcher v. Superior Court,8 a man was
severely injured after being struck by an automobile. At the time of
the accident, he and his girlfriend had been living together as man
and wife for eleven and a half years, but without the benefit of mar-
riage. They had two children together, filed joint income tax returns,
and had joint bank accounts. The California court allowed the wo-
man to recover for loss of consortium.
On the other hand, suppose a man and woman are engaged, but,
before the marriage, one of them is injured. May the other recover
for loss of consortium? A number of lower court cases in Pennsylva-
nia have denied recovery, 9 however, in Sutherland v. Auch InterBoro
4. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87 U.S. App. D.C. 57 (1950).
5. Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
6. Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
7. Id. at 172, 162 A.2d at 674.
8. 139 Cal. App.3d 58, 188 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1953); cf. Bullock v. U.S., 487 F. Supp.
1078 (D.N.J. 1980). In this case, the Bullocks obtained a decree of divorce in 1974 after 23
years of marriage. Later, they resumed relations in an effort to reconcile and eventually re-
marry. In September 1977, Mr. Bullock suffered injuries that prevented him from having sex-
ual relations. In a Federal Tort Claims suit, the court allowed recovery for loss of consortium
to the ex-wife, even though the couple had not remarried. But cf. Ford v. Wagner, 153 Mich.
App. 466, 395 N.W.2d 72 (1986) (holding that a man living with a woman, without benefit of
legal marriage, may not maintain an action for loss of consortium under the Dram Shop Act
or under Michigan common law); Talley v. B. & 0. R.R., 74 Del. County Rep. - (1986)
(holding that plaintiff bears the burden of proving a common-law marriage - absent such
proof, "wife-plaintiff's" claim for loss of consortium must be dismissed.
9. See Rockwell v. Liston, 71 Pa. D. & C.2d 756 (1975) and Curry v. Caterpillar Trac-
tor Co., 957 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Also denying recovery where the injury occurs
during engagement but prior to marriage, see Chiesa v. Rowe, 486 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Mich.
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Transit Co.,1" the court awarded loss of consortium to the husband
even though he married his wife after the accident.
In cases involving spouses, Hitaffer v. Argonne Co." must be
mentioned because this case broke ground for the wife's recovery in
a loss of consortium situation. The Hitaffer court defined "consor-
tium" to include not only marital services, but the love, affection,
companionship and sexual relations between spouses.
More recently, the courts have been asked to decide whether
parents may recover for the loss of consortium of children, or vice
versa. Those of us who were here at last year's seminar will recall
that I traced the development of the pecuniary loss rule, which ini-
tially permitted recovery to parents only for their economic loss
when a child was killed by another's negligence, less the parents'
prospective cost of continued support and maintenance of the child.
The troublesome aspect of the rule was that it enabled a negligent
defendant to assert that he had conferred a positive economic benefit
on the parents by killing the child, since the cost to the parents of
maintaining and educating a child would far exceed the child's con-
tribution to the family. Eventually, a Michigan court in Wycko v.
Gnodtke1 recognized the so-called lost investment theory: that par-
ents invest their money, labor and sacrifice for the maintenance and
education of minors, in part, in expectation that the minors will
eventually provide companionship, comfort and consortium to the
parents, particularly in their aging years, so that loss of the child
results in loss of the parents' investment. This theory was substan-
tially adopted by the Superior Court in Berry v. Titus." In Berry the
court permitted a divorced wife to share in the recovery of damages
for the loss of intangible prospective benefits resulting from the
death of a minor son, even though the wife was separated from her
1980), citing a number of California cases; Angelet v. Shivar, 602 S.W.2d 1185 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980); Sawyer v. Bailey, 413 A.2d 165 (Me. 1980); Sostock v. Reiss, 92 Ill. App.3d 200, 415
N.E.2d 1094 (1980).
10. 366 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also Stahl v. Nugent, 212 N.J. Super. 34,
514 A.2d 1367 (1986), overruling Mead v. Baum, 76 N.J.L. 33, 69 A. 962 (1908). The court
in Stahl rejected Mead's position that a groom takes his bride as he finds her, and that his
claim is like that of a man who hires an injured employee and then seeks damages from the
tortfeasor for the inability of the employee to function fully. Such a parallel is now seen as
callous. Given the fact that the plaintiffs were engaged to be married at the time of the injury
and did, in fact, marry thereafter, any proved loss of consortium which the newly-wed husband
sustained from the time of the marriage, should not be disallowed because of a legal catch
phrase.
I1. 87 U.S. App. D.C. 57 (1950).
12. 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960).
13. 346 Pa. Super. 376, 499 A.2d 661, allowance of appeal granted, 511 Pa. 298, 512
A.2d 187 (1986).
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husband, did not have custody of the boy, and had made no financial
contribution to the support of the son. The court stressed that the
wife had conferred some minimal benefits upon the child during the
marriage; however, the court determined that she failed to show any
loss of potential financial benefits from her son's death. Instead, the
court focused on her active role in raising the boy for fourteen of his
fifteen years of life, and the affection that existed between the two.
Despite the fact that the wife suffered no economic loss, the court
allowed her to share in the recovery of damages for loss of consor-
tium and possible future aid and comfort from the boy.
Apart from Berry v. Titus, I call your attention to some Penn-
sylvania cases which are analogous to our issue. These cases have
denied parents any right of recovery against a physician who negli-
gently performs a vasectomy or a tubal ligation, with the resultant
birth of a healthy, bouncing baby. It is my observation that courts
everywhere uniformly deny recovery for the cost of a child's educa-
tion. Even though avoidance of those costs was the reason for seek-
ing either the vasectomy or the tubal ligation, the majority of courts
reason that a child's infinite, immeasurable worth and the benefits to
the parents of the joy, companionship and affection (i.e., consortium)
of that child, must be deemed, as a matter of law, to outweigh the
costs of raising the child. 14 Obviously, courts should not blow hot
and cold. If the joys, companionship and affection (those were the
very words used in Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital'5) out-
weigh the costs of maintaining the child in such malpractice cases,
they should also outweigh the costs of maintenance when injuries
inflicted upon the child by a negligent driver deprive the parents of
the same joy, companionship and affection. If the child is priceless in
the one case, he should be equally priceless in the other. On this
basis, a number of lower court cases in Pennsylvania have recognized
the parents' right to recover for loss of a child's consortium.' 6
Unfortunately, our Superior Court has not been consistent. De-
spite Berry v. Titus, a number of Superior Court cases assert that a
14. See Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982);
Garrison v. Foy, 486 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. 1985).
15. 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982).
16. See Lavelle v. Frankford Hospital, 9 Phila. 263, and Ripley v. Chapman, (Erie C.P.
No. 2254-A, Aug. 1985). Many other states have ruled likewise: see Wallow v. City of Keo-
kuk, 190 N.W.2d 439 (Iowa 1972); Lockart v. Besel, 71 Wash.2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967);
Green v. Bittner, 85 N.J. 1, 424 A.2d 210 (1980); Cavnor v. Quality Control Parking, Inc.,
696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985). See also Ingraham v. U.S., 808 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1987),
where a mother was held entitled to $750,000 for the loss of the society of her child injured by
a negligent government physician.
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parent's claim for loss of consortium has not been recognized in
Pennsylvania. In Boarts v. McCord,17 Judge Wieand, in a concurring
opinion, goes out of his way to say that a parent's claim for loss of
consortium of a child has not been recognized by our appellate
courts. Respectfully, we might point out that Judge Wieand makes
no reference to Berry v. Titus, or to the implications of Mason v.
Western Pennsylvania Hospital. In addition, he fails to note the cor-
relative cases in which children have been permitted to recover for
loss of consortium in death cases involving a parent. Is there any
principle in logic on the basis of which a child may recover in a case
where the parent dies, but the parent may not recover for loss of
consortium where the child dies?
Likewise, consider the other side of the coin: the child's right to
recover for loss of consortium when the parent is killed by a third
party's negligence. In Pennsylvania, recovery was allowed to a child
in Spangler v. Halm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express.18
Many cases have so held.1 9 Interestingly enough, in Steiner v. Bell
17. 354 Pa. Super. 96, 511 A.2d 204 (1986). But cf. Dralle v. Ruder, 148 Ill. App.3d
961, 500 N.E.2d 514 (1986). The Illinois court cites earlier cases which allowed recovery for
loss of consortium in wrongful death cases. Dralle and other cases sustained a cause of action
for a parent's loss of consortium even where the child was not killed but injured. The court
held "[ilt would be anomalous to deny the parents of a non-fatally injured minor a cause of
action for loss of society and companionship." Id. at -, 500 N.E.2d at 516. The court also
noted that "It]he chief value of children to their parents is the intangible benefits they provide
in the form of comfort, counsel and society." Id. at - 500 N.E.2d at 516. See also Size-
more v. Smock, - Mich. App. -, 400 N.W.2d 706 (1986), allowing the parent of a
negligently injured child to recover for loss of consortium.
18. 396 Pa. 482, 153 A.2d 490 (1959).
19. See First Nat'l Bank of Meadville v. Niagra Therapy Mfg. Corp., 229 F. Supp. 460
(W.D. Pa. 1964); Thomas v. Conemaugh & Blacklick R.R., 133 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Pa.
1955), afj'd 234 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1956); Attamuro v. Milner Hotel Inc., 540 F. Supp. 870
(E.D. Pa. 1982). In Beikmann v. International Playtex, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 255 (D. Colo.,
1987), Judge Carrigan held that, as a federal judge, he was bound by, but critical of, Colorado
law, under which a minor may not recover for loss of his parents' consortium. He pointed out
that, "The modern trend of authority and the more persuasive cases . . ." allow the child's
recovery. He also emphasized the comment of the late Dean William Prosser, that, "It is not
easy to understand or appreciate the reluctance to compensate the child who has been deprived
of the care, companionship and education of his mother, or for that matter his father, through
the defendant's negligence. This is surely a genuine injury, and a serious one, which has re-
ceived a great deal more sympathy from the legal writers than from the judges." W. PROSSER,
TORTS, § 125, at 896 (4th ed. 1971). Further, Judge Carrigan noted that, "Clearly the need of
a child for the law's protection is greater than the need of a spouse, because an adult is more
likely able to fend for himself or herself. In this age of single parent families, many children
who lose a parent have no other to guide, comfort and support them on the hazardous road to
responsible adulthood. If the wrongdoer who inflicts the loss is not to be held responsible, the
cost will be borne by society either through providing a substitute for a home environment and
step-parents, or by paying the usually higher cost attendant on dealing with the social and
psychological problems frequently created by children of shattered families when they become
juveniles and adults."
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Tel. Co.,2 0 the Pennsylvania Superior Court implicitly recognized the
right of children to recover for loss of consortium where the parent is
negligently killed, but denied recovery where the parent is merely
negligently injured.
Steiner notwithstanding, in the main, Pennsylvania cases ad-
dressing loss of consortium have failed to distinguish cases where the
parent is killed from cases in which the parent is severely injured. It
is difficult to explain why there should be a difference in the two
situations. If a child may recover under the Wrongful Death statutes
for loss of a parent's consortium, despite the pecuniary loss rule, why
should he not be equally permitted to recover when a parent is alive,
but has been rendered permanently comatose or paraplegic, and,
thus, unable to give parental guidance, training, support and love? It
would seem that the child's loss exists in both situations. In any
event, there are many cases from other jurisdictions which clearly
recognize a child's right to recover for loss of consortium where the
parent has been negligently killed.21 Steiner makes another surpris-
ing, even frivolous, distinction between a parent's right to recover for
loss of a child's consortium, and the child's right to recover for loss
of the parent's consortium. If the family relationship justifies a par-
ent's right to recover for loss of the child's consortium, is not the
converse also true? To reinvoke the words of Justice Musmanno,
why is not sauce for the goose, sauce for the gander? The majority
in Steiner asserts that it is improper to equate children who sue
under the Wrongful Death statute with children whose parents are
negligently injured, and it also finds a difference between parents vis-
a-vis children, and children vis-a-vis parents. Such flimsy distinctions
are not made elsewhere. Since 1980, at least ten jurisdictions have
held that children may sue for loss of consortium of a living injured
parent.2
Lawyers' Alert magazine suggests that, in any state, it "could
well be malpractice in a personal injury case in which injured par-
ents are living, not to include a loss of consortium claim in the
child's complaint. 12 8 It appears that from 1980 to early 1987, there
20. - Pa. Super. - , 517 A.2d 1348 (1986). See also Craig v. IMT Insurance Co.,
No. 118/86-535 (June 17, 1987) (Iowa Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, permitted recovery by a
parent for loss of consortium resulting from the death of a 6 /2-month viable unborn child,
even though state laws did not permit a wrongful death claim).
21. For a listing of cases, see 22 C.J.S. Death § 104 n.71.
22. See Lawyers' Alert, Dec. 1, 1986, at 1, 8; see also cases collected in 27 ATLA L.
Rep. 205, 250 (1984), 28 ATLA L. Rep. 295, 439 (1985); 29 ATLA L. Rep. 388 (1986); 71
ABA L.J. 47 (1985).
23. Lawyers' Alert, Oct. 20, 1986, at 5.
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are only about a dozen jurisdictions so holding, but it would seem
that the handwriting is on the wall. Yet Pennsylvania, instead of be-
ing in the vanguard of judicial reform, is waiting until the tortoise
crosses the finish line and the overwhelming weight of authority
swings, as it did before, recognizing a wife's right to recover for loss
of consortium.
We come now to the question of whether recovery should be
granted to a sibling where another has been negligently killed or in-
jured. Here, the weight of authority seems to be against allowing
recovery." ' As long as Pennsylvania questions the right of children to
recover for loss of consortium of parents, it is unthinkable that our
courts would allow recovery for loss of consortium of a sibling. How-
ever, there are a number of cases in other jurisdictions which have
recognized such a right to recovery. 5 I predict that, eventually, this
recovery will also be allowed in Pennsylvania. Factually, such cases
may have great appeal.
I trust that I may make some personal references, by way of
illustration. I have a male client, now retired, who, since he was a
young child, lived with a sister some ten years older than he. When
their parents died, she mothered him. They continued to live to-
gether, and neither of them married. They owned most of their prop-
erty jointly. Each ministered to the other when one was ill. The sister
kept house and did most of the cooking and laundry. When they
travelled, they did so together. Her recent death has devastated him.
He misses her sisterly affection and companionship. Certainly, he
has suffered a loss of consortium.
One of my secretaries makes her home with her two sisters. All
three are widows, and they share the parental home, chores and ex-
penses. Each ministers to the others in time of need. My secretary
has periodically been ill for the past year and has required major
surgery. Her sisters tend to her needs day and night, comforting her
and providing faithful care, as she has done for each of them. Each
24. For example, see In re Air Crash Disaster, 771 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1985).
25. See Crystal v. Hubbard, 414 Mich. 297, 324 N.W.2d 869 (1982); Freeman v.
United States Casualty Co., 88 So.2d 423 (La. 1956); Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Beasley, 158
Miss. 370, 130 So.499 (1930); Gulf Mobile & O.R.R. v. White, 219 Miss. 342, 68 So.2d 458
(1953); cf. Scott v. Burger King, 95 Mich. App. 694, 291 N.W.2d 174 (1980); LaForest v.
Autoridad de las Fuentes Fuviales de Puerto Rico, 345 F.2d 443 (Ist Cir. 1976); see also
Salinas v. Forth Worth Cab & Baggage Co., No. C5724, slip op. (Texas Supreme Court Feb.
25, 1987), where a woman was raped and sodomized by a cab driver. She recovered for her
injuries and impairment of her relationship with her husband. In addition, her children, who
were present during the rape, were permitted to recover for their mental anguish and impair-
ment of their relationship with their mother and with their father. See also Hibpshman v.
Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1987).
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says of the others, "I have the two best sisters in the world!" If any
one were to be seriously injured or killed by the negligence of a third
party, would not the others suffer a loss of consortium and shouldn't
that loss be compensable?
I am the grandfather of two boys who were adopted by one of
my daughters and her husband at their birth, a matter of two weeks
or less apart. Both are now eleven years old. Two years ago while at
my home, Chris committed some childish mischief and his father
scolded him in the presence of the rest of the family. Chris ran sob-
bing into his bedroom. In a moment, his brother Don went quietly
into the bedroom to throw his arms about Chris and hug and kiss
him. I am not ashamed to confess that I had tears in my eyes.
Some of you may recall the old advertisement used by Father
Flanagan in seeking funds for Boys' Town. The ad portrayed a smil-
ing young urchin carrying a little crippled lad on his back. The cap-
tion was, "He ain't heavy, Father, he's my brother." Consortium be-
tween children who are siblings through adoption? Why not? There
can be as strong a bond between them as that between spouses, or
between parents and their biological children."
You may rightfully ask, "How far do we go with this consor-
tium business?" May a neighbor seek compensation for loss of con-
sortium of a next-door friend? What about cousins, uncles, aunts,
grandparents, schoolmates? No matter how close the relationship be-
tween them, somewhere a line must and will be drawn, in much the
same way that New York courts adopted the "First House" rule in
determining how far liability for a negligently-caused fire should go.
Under the New York rule, when Mrs. O'Leary's cow allegedly
kicked the lantern that started a conflagration which burned down
most of Chicago, liability would have been limited to the first
house.2" So too, we have the analogy in Pennsylvania and else-
26. The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently held that the use of the phrase, "of the
body," in a will or trust does not evidence an intent on the part of a decedent to exclude as
beneficiaries persons adopted as minors. Estate of Ogden, 353 Pa. Super. 273, 509 A.2d 1271
(1986). The trend everywhere is to hold the status of an adopting parent and adopted child as
indiscernible from that of any other parent and child. The Pennsylvania Probates, Estates and
Fiduciaries Code states that adoptees shall be treated the same as biological children. See 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2108.2507(4), 2514(7), 6114(4). Accord Mo. Pac. RR Co. v. Lane,
720 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Ct. App., 1986) (parents recover for past and future loss of companion-
ship resulting from death of son, whose stalled car was struck by train). See also Morgan v.
LaLumiere, 493 N.E.2d 226 (Mass App., 1986) (holding that a dependent handicapped adult
child may recover for loss of consortium, even though mother was more at fault than negligent
tortfeasor).
27. Ryan v. N.Y. Central, 35 N.Y. 210 (1866); see dissent by Justice Andrews in Pal-
sgraf v. Long Island, 248 N.Y. 339; 347, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928) (Andrews, J. dissenting).
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where,2 8 of recovery allowed for emotional disturbance resulting
from observing an accident in which a defendant negligently injures
or kills another.
The case of Sinn v. Burd2 held that where a child was struck
and killed by an automobile, the child's sister and mother, who ob-
served the accident, could recover for emotional distress even though
they were outside the "zone of danger" of any physical injury to
themselves.30 The rule of Sinn, however, has been strictly limited to
allow recovery only if they observed the accident while it was hap-
pening. Thus, courts will deny recovery to a family member who is
merely informed of the death or injuries after the accident.
Such cases provide an appropriate analogy to be followed in the
consortium situation; they would impose liability for loss of consor-
tium whenever any member of the family is deprived with reference
to any other member of the family. It is noteworthy that Sinn v.
Burd does not make superficial distinctions between death cases and
personal injury cases, or between emotional distress suffered by a
parent, or by a child or a sibling. Such a rule would have the advan-
tage of simplicity, and at the same time, would have definite, albeit
arbitrary, limitations. As stated by Prosser, "[a]dmittedly, such re-
strictions are quite arbitrary, for no reason in themselves, and would
be imposed only in order to draw a line somewhere short of undue
liability."'" But, I repeat, if there must be an arbitrary line, it should
not be drawn so that it excludes consortium between members of the
immediate family. Of course, there are situations within the family
and sometimes even between spouses, where little love is lost and
animosity exists rather than consortium. These, however, are eviden-
tiary matters which can be submitted to the jury for evaluation and
determination of the value of the consortium in the particular
circumstances.
The problem is not solved merely by noting that the courts in
28. See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
29. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979).
30. Cf. Kriventsov v. San Rafael Taxicabs, Inc., 186 Cal. App.3d 1445, 229 Cal. Rptr.
768 (1986), where the Court held that an uncle, living in a single home with his nephew and
the nephew's grandparents, had a sufficiently close relationship to entitle the uncle to by-
stander recovery for emotional distress when the child was negligently killed; Vasquez-Gonza-
lez v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App.3d 1507, 231 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1986) where the court held
that there was a sufficiently close relationship between three grandchildren and their grand-
mother to permit the grandchildren to bring an action for damage for emotional distress that
they suffered when they witnessed their grandmother's accident and resultant injuries. Only
one of the three grandchildren lived with the grandmother, but all three children spent a great
deal of time with her.
31. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th ed. 1971).
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Pennsylvania thus far find that there is no "duty" in favor of sib-
lings. As stated by Lancaster Judge Perezous, in his scholarly hold-
ing in Laskie v. Zimmerman,
[t]here is a duty if the court says there is a duty. The law,
like the Constitution, is what we make it. Duty is only a word
with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be
liability; it necessarily begs the essential question. When we find
a duty, breach and damage, everything has been said. The word
serves a useful purpose in directing attention to the obligation to
be imposed upon the defendant, rather than the causal sequence
of events; beyond that it serves none. In the decision whether or
not there is a duty, many factors interplay: the hand of history,
our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience of administra-
tion of the rule, and our social ideas as to where the law should
fall. In the end, the court will decide whether there is a duty on
the basis of the mores of the community.82
II. Governmental and Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania 
3
The most popular theory of the origin of sovereign immunity is
that it derived from the English doctrine of, "The King can do no
wrong." By the time of Henry III in the mid-13th century it was
well settled that the King could not be sued without his consent. In
theory, our Revolutionary War proved that adage false, but the
American states, including Pennsylvania, reaffirmed sovereign im-
munity and later extended it by analogy to subdivisions of the state
and local governments. Since the restoration of the monarchy in
1662, the immunity exercised by Pennsylvania as a sovereign has
been greater than that granted any English monarch.
34
Eventually, a majority of the states rejected sovereign immu-
.nity, at least in part. Commentators have opposed it almost unani-
mously.3 5 Indeed, the doctrine of sovereign immunity and its coun-
terpart, governmental immunity, have been criticized by
Pennsylvania judges almost from time immemorial.36
In Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education,"7 a gov-
32. 35 Pa. D. & C.3d 593 (1985).
33. Historically, Pennsylvania has distinguished sovereign immunity from governmental
immunity. The former refers to the Commonwealth and some not yet fully defined subdivi-
sions. Presumably, sovereign immunity had separate and much earlier origins. See Note, 84
DICK. L. REV. 717, n.1 (1980).
34. See Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't. of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).
35. Id. at 387, 388 A.2d at 710.
36. Id. at 388, 388 A.2d at 711.
37. 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973).
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ernmental immunity case, a student in the public schools sued the
school district for the loss of an arm in a shredding machine in his
upholstery class, allegedly because of negligence of school district
employees. Though acknowledging that governmental immunity has
been sustained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as constitution-
ally mandated, the majority in Ayala held that governmental immu-
nity was merely a common-law doctrine created by the court. The
Ayala majority ruled that, "[w]e closed our courtroom doors without
legislative help and we can likewise open them."3 In reaching its
decision, the court considered all arguments in favor of immunity,
including public policy considerations, fear of excessive litigation,
and lack of governmental funds; however, the majority by a four to
three vote ruled that governmental immunity for a tort was an
anachronism without rational basis.
The court noted that it had frequently suggested that the legis-
lature undertake the abrogation of government immunity, but with-
out success and, therefore, the court was now itself abolishing this
judicially-created doctrine. Judging the matter as we do from the
sidelines, it seems wholly proper that having made a serious mistake,
the court should not plead that the legislature must correct the error.
It was about time that the court undid its own wrong.
On the same day that Ayala was decided, the court also ad-
dressed Brown v. Commonwealth. 9 Brown sued the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania for injuries sustained when a National Guard jeep
injured her in an automobile accident. The Commonwealth raised
the defense of sovereign immunity. Justice Pomeroy, a member of
the majority in Ayala, joined with the three dissenters from that
case to make the majority in Brown, and denied that sovereign im-
munity was a common-law doctrine. Instead, the Brown court held
that a sovereign immunity was mandated by Article I, Section II, of
the Declaration of Rights of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The
Declaration corresponds to the Bill of Rights of the federal Constitu-
tion and provides in part:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy
by due course of law, and right and justice administered without
sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Com-
monwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as
38. Id. at 600, 305 A.2d at 885.
39. 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 877 (1973) (Manderino,J., dissenting).
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the Legislature may by law direct. 0
There are twenty-six sections in Article I and each is concerned
with the rights of the people, not with powers of the state. I note that
many of you in the audience had the misfortune of sitting in my
Saturday morning classes on Constitutional Law, and you may re-
call, that, beginning with my first lecture, I would stress that a con-
stitution, by definition, is a set of limitations on the powers of gov-
ernment, and that its function is not to create powers for
government. This is particularly true of a Bill of Rights or a Decla-
ration of Rights. That is the absolute last place where one should
expect to see powers conferred on government at the expense of the
people. If there be any place in which the finding of powers of gov-
ernment is incongruous with the purpose of the Constitution, that is
it. In any event, it is obvious that the only pertinent part of the en-
tire Declaration of Rights giving comfort to the state is the last sen-
tence of Section II: "All courts shall be open; and every man having
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the
Commonwealth, in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as
the legislature may by law direct. 41 (emphasis added).
The three critical words in this passage are, "in such cases,"
because the phrases, "in such manner" and "in such courts" are
merely procedural. The three troublesome words are part of what is
otherwise a procedural provision. Indeed, Justice Manderino so
urged in his dissent in Brown, as did Judge Papadakos in Smith v.
City of Philadelphia.2 Justice Manderino, dissenting in Brown, ar-
gued that those three words should be interpreted in the context of
the entire Declaration of Rights and of the entire last sentence, most
of which deals with procedure.
As of May 13, 1973, the court's four to three pronouncement in
Ayala had eviscerated governmental immunity, while Brown sus-
tained sovereign immunity on the rationale that it was constitution-
ally mandated, and required legislative authority in order for a pri-
40. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
41. PA. CONST. Art. 1, § II. Note that § I I employs the words, "shall be open," .every
man . . . shall have remedy," and "without ... denial or delay." No exceptions are made for
suits against the Commonwealth or any governmental agency.
42. - Pa. Super. -, 516 A.2d 306 (1986). See also Mayle v. Pennsylvania Dep't
of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978), where Justice Roberts suggested that those
three words enabled the legislature to make Pennsylvania immune only "in certain cases," i.e.,
exceptional ones.
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vate individual to sue the state.
The next development did not occur until Mayle v. Pennsylva-
nia Department of Highways.4 In Mayle, the plaintiff brought suit
against the Pennsylvania Department of Highways for injuries
caused by alleged negligence in the maintenance of a state highway.
The defense was sovereign immunity. The majority, in a four to
three vote, and speaking through Justice Roberts, abrogated the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity and held that whatever justification had
been used in support of the doctrine in the past was no longer ac-
ceptable. The majority rules, as it did in Ayala, that none of the
arguments in favor of immunity were valid, and that the immunity
previously accorded the Commonwealth was one at common law,
and not derived from the Constitution. Accordingly, the majority
ruled that the court could correct its own prior mistakes, and that
nothing in Article I, Section II, precluded the abrogation of sover-
eign immunity.
It was unfortunate, however, that in this ruling, Justice Roberts
stated unnecessarily, "[t]he Constitution is . . . neutral-it neither
requires nor prohibits sovereign immunity.""" He then stated that,
although the Constitution was not intended to grant constitutional
immunity to the Commonwealth, the legislature might, if it wished,
choose cases in which the Commonwealth would be immune." Al-
though the Pennsylvania legislature had failed to take any action to
protect the rights of victims in past generations, it now promptly ac-
ted on Justice Roberts' dicta and enacted both a sovereign immunity
law and a governmental immunity law,46 almost before the ink on
the Mayle decision had dried. The Acts were passed on September
28, 1978, and were quickly signed by then-Governor Shapp less than
a month following the Mayle decision. The effect of the statutes was
to nullify both Ayala and Mayle and to reinstate both governmental
43. 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978).
44. Id. at 400, 388 A.2d at 716.
45. Id. at 401, 388 A.2d at 717.
46. I PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2310 (Purdon Supp. 1986). This statute reads as follows:
§ 2310. Sovereign immunity reaffirmed; specific waiver
Pursuant to section I I of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is
hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Common-
wealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties,
shall continue to enjoy sovereign and official immunity and remain immune from
suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.
When the General Assembly specifically waives sovereign immunity, a claim
against the Commonwealth and its officials and employees shall be brought only
in such manner and in such courts and in such cases as directed by the provi-
sions of Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procedure) unless otherwise
specifically authorized by statute.
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and sovereign immunity, to the same extent that they existed before
these cases were decided. What a total waste of judicial time!
Even before Brown, Ayala and Mayle, the courts recognized ex-
ceptional situations in which suits could be brought against the Com-
monwealth or its agencies. It is noteworthy, however, that these new
statutes specifically enacted to meet Mayle and Ayala, called for a
general rule of immunity and then established eight narrowly limited
exceptions under each Act similar to the previously recognized ex-
ceptions. All of this has occurred because of the unfortunate state-
ment by Justice Roberts.4
In turn, Justice Roberts' invitation to the legislature to legislate
both itself and the government out of tort responsibility stemmed
from the failure of the court to meet the constitutional issue that the
three words, "in such cases," presented. The court majority failed to
note that the three words were an aberration, and completely incon-
gruous with the Declaration of Rights and with the entire purpose of
the rest of Section 11. Moreover, the court also failed to properly
apply the rule that, given what appears to be a conflict in statutory
or constitutional language, a reasonable effort should be made to
reconcile and give effect to all of it. Not only did the court fail to
avail itself of the opportunity to describe the last sentence as having
a procedural content, but the result of the majority decision was to
completely emasculate, with reference to suits against local or state
government, all of Section 11 except the last sentence. It is submit-
ted that to enforce only the three words in Section 11 is as anoma-
lous as to allow King John to rely on the Magna Carta to continue
one of his multitude of abuses which somehow may have slipped
through the crevices of the Magna Carta's limitations. If you will
permit another metaphor, these three words are to the Declaration of
Rights and Section 11 what a wart would be on the nose of an other-
wise beautiful woman. We cannot accept the protestations of the
majority that those three words render its views inescapable. Chief
Justice Hughes put it correctly when he said, "[w]e have a Constitu-
tion, but the Constitution is only what the courts say it is."' 48
In 1976, we celebrated the Bicentennial of the Declaration of
Independence. The program of the Third Circuit Judicial Confer-
47. The unfortunate statement made by Justice Roberts was also made by then-Justice
Nix, dissenting in Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 454 Pa. 179, 189, 301 A.2d
849, 853 (1973) (Nix, J., dissenting). The court denied recovery against the Board for the
death of a minor to whom liquor had been improperly sold; the minor fell to his death from a
height of eleven floors.
48. S. CHASE, THE TYRANNY OF WORDS 317 (1966).
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ence included a New England professor who spoke on the esoteric
question of whether recent civil rights decisions would have been dif-
ferent if the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th
Amendment had not been enacted. He opined that the Court would
probably have reached the same result by relying on other clauses of
the Constitution and giving them the appropriate content. During an
intermission, I spoke with that lecturer and with Mr. Justice Bren-
nan. After stating that I agreed with the speaker's comments, I
made the observation that having read every Supreme Court decision
for the prior forty years, I was of the opinion that our judges usually
choose the result that they wish to reach first, and then find lan-
guage to justify their conclusion. Justice Brennan smiled and said,
"If you were to state that opinion as a fact, I should be unable to
disprove it." Respectfully, lawyers and judges are loath to admit that
important decisions are predicated on gut feeling or instinct, even
when they bring to bear all of their knowledge and prior experience,
and, of course, their bias. And so we dignify and deify the process by
calling it a judgment.
Despite ages of judicial criticism of sovereign immunity, the
majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finds comfort in point-
ing to those three words in an effort to show that its decision was
unavoidable. There are still judges who regard law and constitutions
as an eternally fecund mother, and themselves as nurses' aides who
assist in delivering newborn decisions. Thus, they hold a new deci-
sion high in the air with one hand (sometimes with fingers of the
other hand pinching their nostrils) and state, "This is it, whatever it
is," and disclaim any paternal responsibility for the decision. To par-
aphrase an old friend, the late Laurence H. Eldredge, if there is any-
thing in that notion, then I submit that those august judges who we
call our Supreme Court have acted as midwives at the births of a
startling number of bastards!
But, alas, there is more to regret. The legislature, in recreating
sovereign and governmental immunity, has limited the amount that
may be recovered. Regardless of the amount of actual damages suf-
fered, the maximum recovery is $500,000 for all claims arising out
of any one accident involving a municipality or subordinate agency
of the state, and $250,000 for any one claim arising against the
Commonwealth."9 As the Amish say, it wonders me that the sums
49. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8553 (Purdon Supp. 1986) ($500,000 limitation on
claim against municipality) and 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986)
($250,000 limit against Commonwealth, with $1,000,000 aggregate limit).
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were not reversed. One would think that the state would be in a
better position to pay $500,000 than would be a school district. But
how can one account for legislative action? A wag once said that no
man's life, liberty, property or rights are safe while the legislature is
in session.
In any event, in Smith v. City of Philadelphia,5 0 the City was
sued for damages arising out of a gas explosion which killed seven
persons, injured many others, and caused substantial property dam-
age. There were seventy-two claimants for property, death and/or
personal injury damages. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs' counsel failed
to recontest the constitutional validity of statutory immunity against
the Commonwealth and the municipalities, and conceded that the
legislature could abolish the right to recover altogether, because of
those three words in Section 11. Instead, plaintiffs asserted merely
that the legislature had no power to limit the amount of recovery,
particularly because of the language of Article III, § 18, which
provides:
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the pay-
ment by employers, or employers and employes jointly, of rea-
sonable compensation for injuries to employes arising in the
course of their employment, and for occupational diseases of em-
ployes, whether or not such injuries or diseases result in death,
and regardless of fault of employer or employe, and fixing the
basis of ascertainment of such compensation and the maximum
and minimum limits thereof, and providing special or general
remedies for the collection thereof; but in no other cases shall
the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for in-
juries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property,
and in case of death from such injuries, the right of action shall
survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose
benefit such actions shall be prosecuted. No act shall prescribe
any limitations of time within which suits may be brought
against corporations for injuries to persons or property, or for
other causes different from those fixed by general laws regulat-
ing actions against natural persons, and such acts now existing
are avoided." 51 (emphasis added).
In addition, the plaintiffs alleged deprivation of due process and
equal protection, as well as violation of Article III, § 32, of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides: "The General Assembly
50. __ Pa. Super. -, 516 A.2d 306 (1986).
51. PA. CoNsT. art. III, § 18.
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shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been or can
be by general law . . "I The majority of the court rejected all of
these arguments, and it sustained the limitation. Justices Papadakos
and Larsen filed strong, persuasive and scholarly dissents, attacking
reliance on those three words, and especially lamenting the fact that
the victims of the explosion had been grossly undercompensated with
an insultingly inadequate amount.
Smith v. City of Philadelphia,5" was followed by Lyles v. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, 4 in which the same majority ruled that
the $250,000 limitation of liability for the Commonwealth was valid,
despite a jury award of $750,000 for a quadriplegic in an automobile
accident caused by the negligence of the Pennsylvania Department
of Transportation. Justices Larsen and Papadakos again dissented.5"
As indicated, an aggregate of only $500,000 (under the Sover-
eign Immunity Act) or $1,000,000 (under the Governmental Immu-
nity Act) is available to claimants who can bring their cases within
one of the eight exceptions. As a result of the Smith and Lyles cases,
the amount of a claimant's recovery under one of the exceptions to
the Immunity Acts may thus depend, fortuitously, not on the nature
and extent of his injuries, damages, pain or suffering; not on the na-
ture or degree of the defendant's fault, nor on whether the defend-
ant's fault is the sole or partial cause of the plaintiff's losses, but on
the number of victims of the defendant's misconduct in a given case.
Thus, if a governmental unit such as SEPTA, were to negligently
cause, in a single accident, the deaths of 50 or 75 lawyers or judges
who are passengers in a commuter train, bus or trolley, the damages
awarded for each victim might well be insufficient even to pay fu-
neral expenses. SEPTA, technically a governmental unit, would be
52. PA. CONST. art. III, § 18.
53. - Pa. Super. - , 516 A.2d 306 (1986).
54. 88 Pa. Commw. 509, 516 A.2d 701 (1986).
55. In Mascaro v. Youth Study Center of Philadelphia, 523 A.2d Il18 (1987), a com-
plaint against the city and a juvenile detention center alleged that the defendants had negli-
gently permitted the escape of a juvenile criminal offender by failing to properly secure doors
and windows of the Center. The juvenile and an accomplice then attempted to burglarize the
plaintiffs' home, raped and sodomized a mother and daughter, and beat them up. As a result,
the despondent husband-father committed suicide. Plaintiffs sought to recover under the "real
property" exception to the Immunity Acts. Reversing the Commonwealth Court, the Supreme
Court, with only Justice Larsen dissenting, dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
statutory "real property" exception permitted recovery only if the injuries were the result of
defective conditions resulting from the maintenance of the property, and did not extend to
failure to control detainees. Apart from the controversial aspects of that limited statutory con-
struction ruling, evidenced by Justice Larsen's dissent, one may be pardoned for raising an
eyebrow at the fact that Justice Papadakos wrote the majority opinion without at least reiter-
ating his basic constitutional objections to governmental immunity.
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liable to each claimant only for a pittance, despite the fact that any
other competing carrier would owe each victim full reparation, how-
ever substantial. It would seem that lives are taken cheaper by the
dozen, if the defendant is a governmental unit, and given enough
victims, payment may be made out of a change purse rather than
out of a wallet.
It is tragic enough that Ayala and Mayle have been utterly
emasculated. But it is ironic that, even in the exceptional areas in
which immunity has been waived, the limit of recovery for each vic-
tim becomes proportionately less as the number of victims increases.
In Kowal v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation,51 a husband brought suit against the Common-
wealth for personal injuries suffered by him, allegedly caused by a
defective state road; the wife sued for loss of consortium. The jury
awarded the husband over one million dollars, and the wife $337,000
for loss of consortium. On motion of the Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT), the verdict was molded to a single award of $250,000
for both spouses. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court, following
Lyles, held that the statutory limitation of damages was valid. The
court noted, however, that Section 8528(b) of the Sovereign Immu-
nity Act provides that, "[rlecovery otherwise permitted against the
Commonwealth shall not exceed $250,000 in favor of any plaintiff,
or $1,000,000 in the aggregate. '57 The court held, mirabile dictu,
that recovery would be awarded to each of the spouses, to a maxi-
mum of $250,000 each, even though it was contended by DOT that
the wife's cause of action for loss of consortium was derived from,
and part of, the husband's claim. The court determined that each
claim was separate. It was also held that the plaintiffs could recover
delay damages, each in the sum of $73,834, but calculated solely on
the $250,000 award for each. 8
Finally, I should like to call your attention to Feingold v.
SEPTA,"9 in which the majority, speaking through Justice McDer-
mott, held that although SEPTA was liable under an exception to
the Sovereign Immunity Act for a jury award of $218,000, an addi-
tional award of $50,000 for punitive damages could not stand. Jus-
56. - Pa. Commw. -, 515 A.2d 116 (1986).
57. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 8528(b) (Purdon 1982).
58. The plaintiff's claim that the delay damages should have been based on the original
jury verdict was denied. Accord, Pennsylvania Dep't of Transportation v. Conrail, - Pa.
Commw .... 519 A.2d 1058 (1986). This case involved a granting of delay damages only up
to the statutory limitation of the immunity statutes even though the jury verdict was in excess
of this limit.
59. 508 Pa. 197, 517 A.2d 1270 (1986) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
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tice McDermott reasoned that, traditionally, governmental agencies
have been exempt from the imposition of punitive damages6" and
contended that punitive damages were "contrary to sound public pol-
icy because such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citi-
zens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised."61 Of
course, that rationale would justify denial of any recovery, even for
actual damages under the exceptions.
Ayala, Brown, and Mayle questioned whether sovereign and
governmental immunity had a constitutional or a common law basis.
Nevertheless, Justice McDermott failed to state whether his ruling
pertaining to the nonavailability of punitive damages stemmed from
constitutional considerations, or whether it was more common law
judicial fiat. If his decision was constitutionally based, it requires
mental gymnastics to devise any justification supported by specific or
implied language in the Constitution. Even the three troublesome
words in Article XXV, § 11 do not proscribe punitive damages; at
most, they merely permit the legislature to deny such damages. Both
the Sovereign and Governmental Immunity Acts are silent as to pu-
nitive damages. Thus, the court would have to stand on its head to
find an "implied" prohibition of punitive damages in the Acts - a
difficult thing to do, particularly as part of the exemptions from gen-
eral immunity. As we have seen, Ayala and Mayle rejected out of
hand any common law basis for any governmental immunity. There-
fore, the ruling on punitive damages is reached inconsistently with
those cases by apparently resorting again to common law.
Quaere, whether the ruling denying punitive damages is not an-
other example of the court's first deciding the result it wants to
reach, and then finding a formula of words which the court thinks,
hopefully, will make the result palatable.
In Feingold v. SEPTA, Justice Larsen filed a strong dissent,
noting that the prophylactic value62 of preventing future harm by the
same wrongdoer through the use of punitive damages is as important
when the wrongdoer is the Commonwealth or a governmental agency
as when he or she is a private individual. Indeed, the ultimate deter-
rent effect of a penalty may well save money, even for the govern-
ment. Justice Larsen again stressed that, under the majority view, a
plaintiff's opportunity for justice depends, irrationally, not upon the
60. Justice McDermott borrowed this language from Hermits of St. Augustine and Phil-
adelphia, 4 Clark 120, 7 Pa. L.J. 124 (1847).
61. Feingold v. SEPTA, 508 Pa. 197, -, 517 A.2d 1270, 1276 (1986) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting).
62. Described in W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 23 (3d ed. 1964).
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1987
nature of the injury or the act which caused it, but upon the identity
or status of the wrongdoer. He reaffirmed the majority opinion in
Ayala which stated, "there are no reasons whatsoever" for immuni-
ties that are strictly status-based, and he again characterized govern-
mental immunity as "an anachronism without rational basis.
'"63
In passing, it may be noted that Mr. Justice McDermott specifi-
cally held that SEPTA was a political subdivision of the Common-
wealth, and treated SEPTA as an "agent of the state." In this case,
the jury award was only $218,000 for compensatory damages.
Therefore, it would not be of great importance whether SEPTA was
treated as part of the state, or as a municipality; but an award of a
sum over $250,000 could raise an important issue as to which of the
two immunity statutes would be applicable to a particular defendant
agency.
In sum, we have reverted, in fact as, well as in spirit, to the
acceptance of the dogma that the King can do no wrong, despite the
fact that England has long since repudiated such notions. Appar-
ently, we have been on a merry-go-round. We almost had the brass
ring-but not quite, and we are now almost back to where we
started before the Boston Tea Party. It is my opinion that the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has assumed for the judiciary the future
burden of interpreting the scope of limits of exceptions, and deter-
mined the classification of particular governmental agencies as "sov-
ereign" or "governmental" in order to fix recovery limits.
63. 508 Pa. 197, - , 517 A.2d 1270, 1280 (1986) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
